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Historical social narratives are dominated by the actions of powerful individuals as well as compe-
titions for power including warfare, revolutions, and political change. Advancing our understanding
of the origins, types and competitive strength of different kinds of power may yield a scaffolding
for understanding historical processes and mechanisms for winning or avoiding conflicts. Michael
Mann introduced a framework distinguishing four types of power: political, military, economic,
and ideological. We show this framework can be justified based upon motivations of individuals
to transfer decision making authority to leaders: Desire to be a member of a collective, avoiding
harm due to threat, gaining benefit due to payment, acquiring a value system. Constructing models
of societies based upon these types of power enables us to distinguish between social systems and
describe their dynamics. Dynamical processes include (a) competition between power systems, (b)
competition between powerful individuals within a power system of a society, and (c) the dynamics
of values within a powerful individual. A historical trend in kinds of power systems is the progres-
sive separation of types of power to distinct groups of individuals. In ancient empires all forms
of power were concentrated in a single individual, e.g. Caesar during the Pax Romana period. In
an idealized modern democratic state, the four types of power are concentrated in distinct sets of
individuals. The progressive separation of the types of power suggests that in some contexts this
confers a “fitness” advantage in an evolutionary process similar to the selection of biological organ-
isms. However, individual countries may not separate power completely. The influence of wealth in
politics and regulatory capture is a signature of the dominance of economic leaders, e.g. the US.
Important roles of political leaders in economics and corruption are a signature of the dominance of
political leaders, e.g. China. Ideological leaders dominate in theocracies, e.g. Iran. Military leaders
dominate in dictatorships or countries where military leaders play a role in the selection of leaders,
e.g. Egypt.
I. INTRODUCTION TO POWER AND GROUP
ACTIVITY
Social power is the ability to control or influence the
behaviors of others. History is often described through
the interaction between individuals exerting power over
one another. Power relations among a set of people deter-
mine whether they are considered as a group or political
entity. Sociologists have been concerned with the under-
lying nature of power, how it arises, how it affects those
that have it and those that don’t, its roles in regulat-
ing relationships between people in groups ranging from
households to global civilization, and categories of power
[1–7].
Michael Mann [8–11] developed a framework in which
there are four types of power: ideological, economic, mili-
tary and political. In his approach these are loosely con-
nected societal networks of control. Ideological power
results from the ability to control meaning in society be-
cause people have a need to define meaning, norms, and
ritual practice. Examples include religions as well as sec-
ular ideologies such as Marxism. Economic power derives
from control over the satisfaction of subsistence needs
through the extraction, transformation, distribution and
consumption of the objects of nature. Political power
derives from the usefulness of centralized, institutional-
ized, territorialized regulation of many aspects of social
behavior. Military power derives from the necessity of
organized physical defense and its usefulness for aggres-
sion, and more specifically concentrated lethal violence.
Mann provides an extensive historical discussion of ex-
amples of how these forms of power occur and relate to
each other over history.
Here we formalize the framework developed by Mann
by showing that it is a “universal” framework for rep-
resenting power due to the inherent structure of indi-
vidual motivation. Mann did not find social theory dis-
cussions of motivations starting from basic human drives
(e.g. sexual fulfillment, affection, health, physical exer-
cise and creativity, intellectual creativity and meaning,
wealth, prestige, power, etc) useful. Our approach more
directly considers the mechanisms and dynamics of power
in group activities. The objective is to understand how
multiple individuals together perform activities in which
an individual, or small group of individuals, determines
what is done. Motivation at the individual level is di-
rectly understood from the perspective of the individ-
ual who yields rather than the individual who exercises
power. The individual who yields power must have a
motivation for the cognitive act of yielding control over
actions, expecting a better condition from doing so than
would otherwise occur. We understand these forms of
power as motivated respectively by: the perceived bene-
fit from membership in a group—political control; the
avoidance of direct harm—military power; the receipt
of direct benefit—economic power; and change in val-
ues self-consistently motivating that change—ideological
power. On the one hand, this discussion relates to the
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2traditional political science of elites that are able to influ-
ence or determine the behavior of groups. On the other
hand, this is an extension of a complex systems character-
ization of the mechanisms by which collective behaviors
arise [12, 13].
II. FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COLLECTIVE
BEHAVIOR
Social systems are built out of coordination of individ-
uals into collective action. One of the important mecha-
nisms for the creation of such behaviors is through con-
trol by one individual over the actions of others. This is a
traditional mechanism by which collective action arises,
distinct from self-organized behaviors such as those of
swarms and flocks which can arise without an individual
exercising control over the collective. The latter has been
the subject of much of complex systems study of collec-
tive action due to its limited treatment in prior work.
Here we extend complex systems concepts to the more
traditional topic of control and power.
Examples of behaviors that involve multiple individu-
als performing the same tasks in unison include marching
soldiers in a Roman legion, or coordinated actions in a
factory. A central question is identifying what model of
an individual is needed in order to identify the mecha-
nisms of collective action. Our objective is not to identify
the actions that are performed but rather the mecha-
nisms of control over actions.
Considering an individual in isolation may not serve
as a basis of description of collective behaviors in many
contexts. In this case, however, there is a meaningful
primitive concept: an individual in isolation performs
actions for self-benefit. Among these actions are food
gathering or shelter construction. How such individually
directed actions are transformed in a social context to
become collective behaviors, that may or may not benefit
the individual, other specific individuals, or society as a
whole, is the question we are addressing.
Mechanisms of control and the actions that they give
rise to may or may not be evaluated as positive or neg-
ative within a value system (i.e. power may be used to
constructively coordinate or to coerce and exploit). This
is not the central question we are discussing, though some
identification of the way types of power are interpreted
in value systems is appropriate once we have identified
the mechanisms.
In considering the structure of power systems it is
useful to identify different types of power. Distinguish-
ing a few types cannot be a complete specification of
their diversity, but can provide a basis for discussion of
the dynamics of power and the evolution of social sys-
tems including, but not limited to, governance struc-
tures. Our analysis will show that the four types of power
identified by Mann [8]—political, military, economic and
ideological—are immediately justified in this context.
The development of a theoretical framework enables
inferences about various properties of power and its dy-
namics. Given different forms of power, their interactions
over time are an important part of the dynamics of power
historically. The consequences of dominance of one indi-
vidual or the dominance of one type of power over others
can be seen historically.
An example of such a dynamic is embodied in the ex-
pression ‘power corrupts,’ which interestingly suggests
that power can be used for either collective or individ-
ual benefits but generally will result in the individual
ones predominating over time. In considering that there
are multiple forms of power, we can reasonably hypothe-
size and observe historically that when one type of power
dominates other types over time more negative conse-
quences for the public arise as well as outsized benefits
for those in power. By comparison, a balance over differ-
ent kinds of power, and dynamic power shifting, yields
benefits for the public. We can understand the reasons
for this observation from an analysis of dominance and
dynamics.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section III we
frame social power as the transfer of authority over de-
cision making. Section IV provides an abstract formal
introduction to the four types of power. Section V de-
scribes political power, Section VI military and economic
power, and Section VII ideological power. Section VIII
discusses the role of institutions in power. Section IX and
Section X describe the representation of power graphi-
cally. Section XI introduces a notation for power systems.
Section XII describes the use of historical data to discuss
power systems. Section XIII describes a selection of his-
torical examples. Section XIV describes the dominance
of power types. Section XV describes the dynamics of
power. Section XVI provides concluding summary.
III. FROM PHYSICAL TO SOCIAL POWER:
FORCE ACTING OVER DISTANCE TO
TRANSFER AUTHORITY
It is interesting to begin by considering the distinction
between power as it is understood in physics and in so-
cial systems. Power in physics is a force exercised over
a distance. We can understand the power to change the
movement of an object in this fashion. The greater the
power, the larger the change in momentum (a change in
speed or direction of motion of an object) that can be
achieved, where other forces are not present. Physical
power thus reflects an ability to determine the behav-
ior of the object. There are circumstances where such
power is also exercised over a person, i.e. direct force
changes the motion of an individual. For example, one
can exercise power over another by pushing them in a
certain direction. While this mechanism of power does
occur, it is significantly different than the way power in
social systems is often described. In social systems, it is
typically assumed that each individual continues to be
autonomously directed, but the control over an action
3that is performed can be transferred from the individ-
ual who is performing that action to another individual
who wields control. This concept of the transfer of au-
thority over decision making is central to the theoretical
framework of power we describe here.
When we consider the role of power in social collec-
tives, power reflects a transfer of authority over decisions
about actions by many individuals to one or a few indi-
viduals, or alternatively to a social abstraction such as
laws or institutions. Such a transfer of authority gives
rise to large scale social actions. The scale of those ac-
tions is to be considered the subject of a dynamic the-
ory of the exercise of power by various authorities. Our
framework provides a basis for such a dynamic theory.
IV. FORMAL FRAMEWORK FOR POWER
In presenting a scientific analysis of a social construct
such as power there is a need to provide formal justifica-
tion for the model constructed as well as a presentation
that can be understood at an intuitive level. These are
linked to observations that begin from quite general ones
and then proceed to progressively more detailed valida-
tion. This section provides a more abstract formal ap-
proach to arrive at the same framework for power as the
subsequent sections and can be omitted at a first reading
by those wishing for the more intuitive approach.
We consider an individual as having the ability to make
decisions about multiple possible actions, i.e. to choose
over time a sequence of actions to perform of many possi-
ble such sequences. We consider the choices by the indi-
vidual to be guided by “motivations” which are distinct
from individual decision making about specific actions in
their generality, i.e. motivations guide many decisions
and their modification changes the overall pattern of de-
cision making. The distinction between motivation and
specific decision making is only in the abstraction of the
model of decision making, i.e. a motivation is an aspect
of the causal reason for many different decisions rather
than a single one.
We define power as the transfer of decision making over
one individual’s actions from that individual to another
individual (a leader). We are not primarily concerned
about the mechanism of that transfer of power, i.e. the
forms of communication that are present to facilitate or
enable it. We will be particularly concerned with the
case where the leader has power over multiple individuals
rather than a single individual.
In building our framework of power, we consider how
motivations of an individual lead to power over the ac-
tions of that individual by another. Such a transfer of
power can itself be considered an action and therefore
should be understood from motivations of the individ-
ual. Human motivations are often limited in scientific
discussions to striving for self-benefit (i.e. economic ra-
tionalism). We consider a more general concept of an
objective oriented motivation—actions that are causally
connected to valued conditions, i.e. values—with self-
benefit as an important and common example of such
values due to its self-consistency through selection for
persistence through relevance for survival. We allow for
self-benefit or measures of achievement of values associ-
ated to an action to be measured both in a positive and
negative sense, with terminology such as harm or cost for
the negative direction.
Beginning from a model of an individual who performs
actions for self-benefit, decision making is motivated by
the individual’s understanding of benefits and costs to
the individual. This decision making can be influenced
if the transfer of power to the leader has the ability to
change the apparent payoffs of the set of actions that are
possible for an individual to make.
We therefore consider four ways a transfer of power
can be motivated. First, by the existence of an underly-
ing expectation of improvement of benefit from the very
nature of a transfer of power. Second and third, by the
leader directly increasing the apparent cost or the appar-
ent benefit to the individual of particular action options,
leading to those actions being avoided or chosen due to
those changes in payoffs. Fourth, by changing the eval-
uations of the payoffs by the individual, e.g. through
changing values. These four options map onto the four
different forms of power that we will consider (political,
military, economic, and ideological). We note that the
motivation for the fourth (power to change values) can
arise self-consistently from within the values themselves,
and has a potential to be inherently recursive, a key prop-
erty of this mechanism for motivation.
V. POLITICAL POWER AND GROUP
COLLECTIVE ACTIVITY
In order to understand power we must also understand
why group collective activities may serve purposes in so-
cial systems. In some contexts, there exist beneficial ac-
tivities that can be performed by joint action of a group,
which individual action cannot perform. Examples in-
clude successful hunting of large animals (i.e. attacks
by multiple individuals may kill a large animal under
circumstances in which an attack by one individual can-
not), time bounded searching (i.e. search and rescue),
and dominance in military conflict. More generally, it
is widely believed that a large variety of problems can
be solved by putting an individual “in charge” of the
actions of multiple individuals. This belief is consistent
with complex systems theory. When one individual is
able to determine the behavior of multiple individuals
comprising a collective, this enables the behavior of that
collective to have a scale and complexity that may be
needed for the successful performance of a task [12, 13].
We note that it is possible to show that the benefits
of such individual authority are bounded under highly
complex conditions where effective distributed control is
more beneficial. However, there are also circumstances
4under which the expectation that putting an individual
in charge will have benefits is justified. Under these cir-
cumstances it makes sense for an individual to desire to
be part of a group that transfers authority over individ-
ual decision making to one individual, i.e. an individual
chooses to be a member of a group rather than “going it
alone.” For our purposes it does not matter if this results
from evolutionarily derived (instinctive) behavior or a so-
cially learned one (conscious or not). We call this type
of transfer of authority for an implicit purpose of collec-
tive (and individual) benefits “political power.” Thus we
see that it can be important to have a leader to perform
effective collective action.
While collective action may have inherent benefits, in-
dividual differences may give rise to different levels of de-
cision effectiveness for political leaders. Thus, it may be
important which leader is given that power. How a group
determines which individual is given political power is a
key aspect of how we understand group activities gener-
ally and systems of collective governance specifically.
We associate our understanding of political power with
the conventional concept of political leaders. This is con-
sistent with the observation that the mechanism of selec-
tion of such leaders can vary and does not have a specific
origin that is characteristic of other forms of leadership.
Other justifications for this association will arise from
specific examples.
VI. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POWER
Two other kinds of power can be readily identified as
the result of threat or reward, the proverbial stick and
carrot incentives. In the former, a direct threat results in
an individual choosing to transfer authority to avoid po-
tential harm. In the latter, transfer of authority is done
to achieve a direct benefit of a specific action. These
are distinct from the general transfer of authority repre-
sented by political power in that they arise from specific
individual assessment of sufficiently well defined negative
or positive consequences of alternative options.
An institutionalized version of power that arises from
threats involves a military or police force, so we term
it “military power.” Actions that arise from associated
benefits rather than threats are often described as volun-
tary and contrasted with threats as being coercive, and
are considered as the subject of economics. We therefore
use the term “economic power.” Our focus is not on all
economic transactions, but rather on transactions that
involve actions by one individual (labor) in response to
benefits (wages).
We note that the decision of an individual to accept
a benefit depends on the relative benefit associated with
alternatives that are available. Considering the relative
benefit makes the distinction between voluntary and co-
ercive concepts less clear than is often assumed in eco-
nomics. I.e. if the only alternative to a transaction is
negative the decision to transact is coercive in much the
same way as a direct threat. For example, the alterna-
tive to wages may be starvation and therefore the choice
made is essentially based upon a threat. Considering an
individual who has control over a critical resource, i.e.
water, such control can enable economic power that is
coercive. Thus, the distinction between voluntary and
coercive arises because of the nature of the alternatives.
When there are, in some sense, adequate alternatives
the exercise of economic power is different from coer-
cion. Military power is by definition dependent on an
adverse alternative; economic power is dependent on ad-
verse alternatives only in so far as there are not better
alternatives. In the study of economics it is assumed the
alternative conditions that might be coercive are not the
responsibility of the benefit provider. Accordingly, it is
not the provider that is the coercive agent, which distin-
guishes economics from coercion. At the same time, the
analysis of behavioral choices and actions of an individ-
ual must consider the set of options that are available to
them and the causes of those options.
VII. VALUES AND IDEOLOGICAL POWER
It is apparent that underlying the exercise of economic
power are the values of the individuals to whom ben-
efits are offered. Values are embodied in the “utility”
of something to an individual as an essential primitive
concept in economic theory. Values are also essential to
political power, as the acceptance of leadership, and more
specifically the choice of a leader to whom authority is
given, depends on the values of those who are voluntarily
transferring authority to the individual who becomes the
leader. Perhaps less obviously, values also underly the
exercise of military power. While the threat of pain or
death is an important motivation for accepting a transfer
of authority, individuals may refuse to heed threats, may
withstand pain, or even accept death, based upon values.
The ability of different individuals to adopt different val-
ues and change them over time, and crucially to transfer
authority over the setting of those values, leads to an ad-
ditional form of power, “ideological power.” Ideological
power in its purest form does not act directly to control
actions but rather controls values that in turn control
the decisions about actions. Ideological power interacts
in important ways with other forms of power. For ex-
ample, by changing values it can reinforce or undermine
economic, military or political leaders. By this definition,
ideological power can be seen to include both ideological
value systems and the individuals who exercise authority
over/within those systems. It is also apparent from the
definition that ideological power encompasses religious
value systems but also systems that are not generally in-
cluded as religious, including patriotism and secular hu-
manism. Value system leaders include all of those who
provide narratives of meaning and significance about the
world. In a secular context, this includes authors, re-
porters, entertainers, producers and teachers. There are
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FIG. 1: We identify four types of power that enable one in-
dividual to control the actions of others. Economic and mil-
itary power arise from rewards and threats, political power
from the expectation of group benefit from central decision
making, and ideological power from transfer of authority over
values.
embedded values in any fiction or non-fiction story and
reporting, including what is important and how it is de-
scribed.
VIII. INSTITUTIONS AND CONVENTIONS
WITH POWER
Laws, institutions and other social conventions should
be understood to serve two (equivalent) roles in our
framework. First, they serve as the “system of power”
within which power is exercised. Second, they can be
understood to circumscribe the power individuals exer-
cise at a particular time. In effect their presence assigns
power to historical figures and processes which are ab-
stractions of individual authority. The mechanism of au-
thority of those abstractions must be embodied through
individuals with current power whose authority can be
understood in relation to those abstractions (e.g. spe-
cific individuals who have interpretive or enforcing roles)
as well as the public. The values of the public in as-
signing authority (i.e. the authority they confer on ab-
stractions and current leaders) constrains the degree to
which leaders can exercise power in relation to those ab-
stractions. In an important sense, laws, institutions and
social conventions as values are incorporated in the reli-
gion/ideology of the populace.
Thus, for example, religious (and other) leaders may
be constrained in their actions by codified religious val-
ues. Political, military and economic authorities (as well
as religious ones) may be constrained by legal systems,
institutions and conventions based upon historical prece-
dent. When leaders test the constraints of those cod-
ified systems, potentially violating or changing them,
the response of other leaders or the populace determines
whether they are able to do so.
IX. GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF AN
INDIVIDUAL
Fig. 1 provides a schematic diagram of an individ-
ual showing political, military, economic and ideological
power as consistent with a simple model of individual be-
havior consisting of (1) a tendency to transfer authority
to others (political power), (2) a desire for benefits (eco-
nomic power), (3) avoidance of harm (military power),
and (4) a system of values, over which authority can also
be transferred (ideological power). This elementary di-
agram of how the decision making of an individual is
controlled and the actions that result can be used to il-
lustrate various types of power systems. A power system
characterizes the way aggregation of actions occur where
different groups of individuals are controlled by compet-
ing powerful individuals, potentially with different types
of power.
X. GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF
AGGREGATION (MULTISCALE ANALYSIS)
We can use the individual level representation to
construct collective representations of social systems in
which power is exercised. An example is shown in Fig.
2 in which a military leader, e.g. a dictator, uses mil-
itary power to exercise control over the populace. The
schematic not only shows that power is exercised over
the populace but explicitly includes the role of individ-
uals in the military to control the public, and the con-
trol of the leader over the military that gives rise to the
control of the leader over the public. As is shown in
the schematic, the relationship between the leader and
the military may involve multiple channels of power, in-
cluding values (ideological, i.e. loyalty, obedience), po-
litical (authority transferred for group benefit, i.e. for
the military group or for the country as a group), mili-
tary (i.e. coercive, threats that might also originate from
other members of the military [not shown separately]),
or economic (i.e. wages). Note also that economic power
over the leader is exercised by the populace as a whole,
i.e. through the flow of taxes to the leader. This power is
not the same as that of an individual exercising power due
to its distribution through the populace (but suggests the
importance of such reciprocal power, especially if wealth
becomes concentrated, or in the event of collective ac-
tion). The complexity of the diagram illustrating a real
world system that involves military power is consistent
with a need for embodying the power in relationships
between individuals used to create that power. Thus,
saying a military leader exercises power is not enough,
the military force through which the power is being ex-
ercised is part of the representation of that power. A
variety of other kinds of power structures can be simi-
larly illustrated by such diagrams (e.g. Fig. 3).
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FIG. 2: Schematic of a social system in which military power
dominates. The leader uses its control over a military or police
force to exercise power over the populace, extracting resources
from the populace that it uses to reward and thus control the
military force.
Public
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FIG. 3: Schematic of a social system in which leaders with
each of the four powers play a role. Many but not all of the
roles that power can play are shown. Military forces are shown
in addition to the military leader. However, in a more com-
plete figure there would also be various political operatives,
corporate managers and clergy and lay leaders.
XI. NOTATION FOR REPRESENTATION OF
SOCIAL POWER SYSTEMS
In this framework, a society is described by a set of
power relationships that comprise a kind of network. We
can define a society as such a network that does not
decompose into independent subgroups. A quantitative
representation of a society is a list of individuals or groups
with a specified number of members and the associated
individuals or groups that exercise power over them:
(n1, name1,name1,p,name1,m,name1,e,name1,r)
(n2, name2,name2,p,name2,m,name2,e,name2,r)
...
(nk, namek,namek,p,namek,m,namek,e,namek,r)
(1)
where namei is an individual’s name or a group name
with number of members ni. Each of the other names in
a list is the identifier of an individual or group exercising
power over that individual, i.e. a leader of a particular
type, in the order of political (p), military (m), economic
(e), or ideological (r). A null or self-reference of a leader
represents the case where that type of leader is not exer-
cising power over the individual, or does not exist. The
properties of the social system depend on the numbers
of members of groups and the structure of the network
of power links. For analysis of the structure the labeling
by names is not essential and may be replaced by ordinal
numbers that index that individual or group.
The formalism can be extended to include laws and
other forms of constraints on leaders, i.e. constitutions,
social conventions, religious documents, or other codified
guides. The simplest way to include them is to name
them and to allow the number of individuals associated
with that element of the system to be zero. This is sim-
ilar to the inclusion of extrinsic forces on the system in
general models of influence networks [14, 15]
For example, a single leader with a military based dic-
tatorship with 1,000 military members and simultane-
ously religious authority over a million citizens might be
represented as:
(1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 1)
(1000, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1)
(1000000, 3, 1, 2, 1, 1)
(2)
Based upon historical information about the role of Ro-
man Caesars in political, military, and economic leader-
ship, this might be considered a simplified model of the
Pax Romana system (see below).
A dictatorship with a separate religious leadership with
100 clergy might be represented as:
(1, 1, 1, 3, 4, 2)
(100, 2, 1, 3, 1, 2)
(1000, 3, 1, 3, 1, 2)
(1000000, 4, 1, 3, 1, 2)
(3)
The notation can be extended to represent systems in
which more than one individual or group exercises par-
tial power over a particular individual or group, by mak-
ing the substitution namek,s → {namek,s,i, wk,s,i} with s
in the set {p, e,m, r}, i an index, and wi the weight of
the respective influencer with partial power. This would
then be a network representation of how individuals are
influenced by multiple other individuals or groups. The
network representation we are identifying has additional
structure compared to a standard influence network [14–
16] by virtue of distinguishing the different categories
of influence, and allowing nodes to represent aggregated
groups rather than individuals. The representation is dif-
ferent from that generally considered in network theory
of generalized mutual influence with a specified structure
of the influence network. It has more distinct structural
elements, but collapses the number of individuals of the
society and the relationships among them onto a con-
7cise and simpler form. This simplification, in which indi-
vidual agents have power over groups, may be useful in
analysis.
The framework developed thus far in this paper de-
scribes a system of roles rather than of individuals within
those roles. Missing is the mechanism by which indi-
viduals are placed into those roles. Those mechanisms
are often integral to the power system itself. Indeed, in
traditional political thinking the definition of a politi-
cal structure is often based upon that mechanism. Thus
a dictatorship or a representative democracy might in
principle (though not usually in practice) differ only in
the way the individual in power gains that power rather
than the powers that that individual exercises. We can
generalize the framework we have discussed to include a
characterization of the processes by which individuals at-
tain power. There is, however, enough to discuss in the
context of the power structure itself for a first article so
we defer much of the discussion of the processes by which
power is attained to a follow-on article, only mentioning
it when essential. Instead we focus on the dynamics of
power systems, the way that the structure of power in
society, as described by the representation we are using,
changes over time.
The dynamics of power systems can be considered in
terms of the representation by identifying (1) illustrative
examples of power systems and their historical trends
and (2) dynamics of power systems through (a) compe-
tition between systems, (b) changes of the structure of
a system by changes in the types of roles present (i.e.
whether a single individual plays multiple power roles),
or the power relations among powerful individuals, and
(c) changes in the values of individual that plays a cer-
tain role. Constructing examples requires the ability to
refer to history, a process fraught with scientific issues
but one which cannot be avoided in this context.
XII. USE OF HISTORICAL CONSENSUS
NARRATIVES AS SCIENTIFIC DATA
Collecting data about social systems for scientific anal-
ysis presents many challenges. Among these is the imple-
mentation of controls on the objectivity of observational
data. In order to discuss our models of power it is help-
ful to have information to compare with across historical
periods. Data sources are often limited to observations
by individuals that are then transmitted through a chain
of communications to the present. Establishing historical
data “facts” for scientific analysis is therefore problem-
atic. However, where information affects many individu-
als, the historical communication of information is more
reliable than the communication of information that per-
tains to individual actions that are less influential. This
reliability arises because of the redundancy of the infor-
mation, which promotes valid transmission through un-
reliable communication channels [17]. In this case, the
communication channel is the historical transmission of
social information. We therefore consider consensus his-
torical narratives that describe events or individuals as to
their influence on many people as having an appropriate,
if limited, level of validity for inclusion in scientific anal-
ysis. It should be apparent that the validity of even such
events may be challenged. The opportunity for such chal-
lenge exists and notwithstanding the possibility that in-
dividual events may be found to be incorrectly reported,
a scientific theory may be compared to existing histori-
cal narratives. We will proceed to consider the way that
historical power systems can be interpreted within the
proposed power framework. Mann’s four volume treatise
[8–11] can be consulted for a much more extensive dis-
cussion of the interplay of the four types of power around
the world and through history.
XIII. THE EXERCISE OF POWER BY
LEADERS
A power system, by definition, means that leaders have
the ability to control what other individuals in the sys-
tem do. The actions of individuals that are controlled
can serve many different purposes. Actions that can be
controlled can be considered a “resource” like land or
raw materials. Leaders will control the actions of others
to achieve what they themselves consider benefits. Thus
the value system of the leaders is an essential attribute
of leadership and its role in society. The premise of indi-
vidual motivations implies a central question is whether
the values of the leader result in self-serving benefits or
benefits to those who are controlled by them, or other
groups. The way leaders are selected plays an important
role in the leader values that are likely to be present.
Achieving benefits that are desired by a leader, includ-
ing self-serving benefits, is a motivation for individuals
to become leaders. Given multiple leaders, the ability to
control is limited by or shared with other leaders. This
limits the ability of one leader to achieve what they be-
lieve is of benefit. Therefore, one of the likely goals of a
leader is to increase their power, so as to increase their
ability to serve what they consider to be a benefit. As
discussed later, this is a generic part of the dynamics of
power systems whether or not the leader is self-serving.
XIV. ILLUSTRATIVE HISTORICAL
EXAMPLES OF POWER SYSTEMS
The four different types of power can interact with each
other in different ways in a specific system. Whether
types of power are combined together within an indi-
vidual or distributed among distinct individuals and the
way powerful individuals exercise power over each other,
so that one type of power might dominate others, distin-
guishes different systems.
The existence of different forms of power must be com-
bined with social separation of these powers in order for
8them to be recognizably distinct at an aggregated level.
Historically, they are not, however, completely separated
but in different systems they become segregated in vari-
ous ways. Understanding the structural forms of power
distribution and their dynamics is important scientifi-
cally and relevant historically. Perhaps a good way to
think about the way this works is like identifying pri-
mary colors in a picture. The elementary nature of these
forms of power allows for concentrated patches but does
not preclude various forms of mixing that are considered
by Mann as networks of power.
Here we limit our discussion to a few observations and
general statements of relevance to historical dynamics of
power systems. One observation that appears supported
by the historical record is that power has become disag-
gregated over time in large countries compared to ancient
Rome and other early empires. A common origin of the
growth of ancient empires was through military conquest.
This naturally led to military leaders that dominate other
forms of power. By contrast, in modern military dictator-
ships, ideological power (often religious) and to varying
degrees economic power are often separated as they were
not in ancient ones.
In the ancient Roman empire during the Pax Romana
period, a Caesar exercised all forms of power, i.e. po-
litical, military, economic and ideological leadership. In
particular, Caesar was considered a god during this pe-
riod. At the beginning of this period, the classical Roman
civilization went from a republic dominated by military
action to a society with essentially three groups [8]: the
emperor, soldiers, and the mass of the people—including
slaves (an estimated 20-40% of the population at the be-
ginning of this period) and nominally free peasants that
merged together into serfdom. A small number of people,
the leadership of the military, might also be considered a
distinct group. The budget (combining that of the state
and that of the emperor, which were not substantially
distinct) was 70% for military and 15% for the dole to
the Roman public, presumably the minimum that could
be given and maintain order. In contrast, US military
spending is 20% of total federal spending / 12% of fed-
eral, state and local spending. The Pax Romana period
was as pure a version of a coercive society as may be
possible with human beings. Its success in space-time
extent can be understood from the stability of such a
system given the value system of the time.
The advent of the major religions led to partial,
though surely not complete, separation of ideological
power from other forms of power in many areas of the
world. Later secular ideologies, including communism,
secular humanism, and more generally patriotism, when
they arose became more closely associated with political
power. Theocracies embody the possibility that ideolog-
ical power becomes dominant, exercising also all other
forms of power to a greater or lesser degree. This is ap-
parent in the periods of Christian Inquisition and the
Crusades, the Islamic conquest and caliphates, and the
modern state of Iran as key examples. The dominance of
religious leaders over other forms of power can be distinct
from military leaders exercising religious authority due
to the origins and primary mechanisms of their power.
Communism suppressed competing ideologies including
religions. Modern governance structures that appear to
be either absent a religion or having adopted pluralis-
tic separation of church and state may be better charac-
terized as variations on patriotic secular humanism. In
this context, the separation of church and state enables
sufficiently compatible religious systems to coexist with
overlapping roles in determining values.
Confucianism provides an important example for our
purposes. Mann’s characterization[8] suggests that
“Confucianism’s role is thus largely one of morale boost-
ing: it introduces no principles of ideological transcen-
dence.” Our analysis suggests a different perspective fo-
cused on the role of the value system itself. Confucianism
has a transparent and self-declared purpose of shaping
the values of leaders away from self-interest and toward
benefit to others, as well as loyalty of subjects. According
to its principles, having virtuous rulers is central to stable
governance. In this it directly targets the essential role of
leadership values: When leaders adopt values that serve
the public, they are supported by the public. Leaders
would adopt it because of the public loyalty it inherently
as well as explicitly promotes. When the public consid-
ers leaders as not fulfilling those values, leaders would
be replaced. Indeed, leadership changes did occur and
Confucianism dominated Chinese values for 2,000 years
until the advent of Communism. Confucianism also em-
bodied an extreme version of a codified value system,
where written abstract ideas are the essential version of
the ideological power. The common knowledge of these
ideas and their transmission through educational insti-
tutions is, to first order, the extent of institutionalized
power structure.
Since the industrial revolution and through the 20th
century, the relationship between economic and political
power was the subject of much of the global ideological
conflict, with different degrees of dominance of political
leadership over economic resources and thus economic
power as reflected in capitalism, socialism, and commu-
nism. These ideologies are in part descriptions of power
systems, though the relationship between the ideological
values and the reality of the power system effects may not
be direct or complete because of limited understanding
of the real world consequences of their implementation.
That people value and expect certain outcomes of power
systems does not make them true properties of those sys-
tems.
In an idealized well functioning modern democracy,
the four domains of power are considered to be sepa-
rated. Each of the powers dominates in its own sector
of public activity, political leadership making policy, mil-
itary and police leadership ensuring security, economic
leadership making production and investment decisions,
and religious leadership promoting altruistic and patri-
otic values. Political power exercises limited control over
9economic power through regulation, and over military
power through control over resources, and also through
ultimate command and the declaration of war.
While separation of the domains of power is consid-
ered the ideal, the exercise of power of economic leaders
over political power through regulatory capture is widely
considered to be found in capitalist systems that em-
phasize independence of economic activity from political
control, including in the US. Corruption is widely con-
sidered to be present in the places where political power
has greater control. We note that US policy has long
opposed corruption. This may seem to be paradoxical as
corruption is superficially similar to the kind of influence
that economic interests have over the US government.
However, our analysis shows that there is a difference.
Influence buying or regulatory capture occurs when eco-
nomic power is being exercised over political power. In
contrast, corruption reflects dominance of political power
over economic power. Hence, economic leaders do not like
corruption. The difference is subtle but real. The prac-
tical reason they are different is that regulatory capture
enables “special interests” to exercise control over pol-
icy, while corruption enables a political power to extract
money for a specific favor that need not provide systemic
benefits, i.e. it is part of business activity (a kind of
tax) rather than part of business policy. When political
power is dominant (China today), political leaders are the
primary beneficiaries of economic activity (i.e. wealth).
When economic power dominates, economic leaders are
the primary economic beneficiaries and they have effec-
tive control over economic policy (US today).
When one power dominates, that power gains author-
ity over other forms of power, determining public decision
making (political power), coercively promoting their con-
trol (military power), extracting wealth from and control-
ling economic activity (economic power), and promoting
values that favor themselves (religious power). Under
such conditions the boundaries between different kinds
of power become blurred.
Moreover, when one type of power becomes stronger
than other types of power, individuals whose leadership
role originates from one source of power become leaders
with other types of power. Thus, when economic power
dominates, wealthy individuals become political leaders.
When political power dominates, political leaders become
leaders of economic institutions, i.e. corporations. These
two directions are apparent in the examples of the US
and China today [18, 19]. Consequences are similar for
military and ideological/religious leaders when they are
dominant.
It is important to emphasize that the populace exer-
cises power in every system and this power is manifest in
diagrams (Figs. 3 and 4) that show the populace exert-
ing power over leadership. Collectively, the power of the
populace is strong, generally stronger than any leader-
ship, but individuals or even groups of the populace have
respectively less power if they do not act in a unified way.
XV. DOMINANCE OF TYPES OF POWER
More systematically, we can list the effects of domi-
nance of one kind of power over another:
4 Where military power dominates over
5 political power: we have dictatorship, police
state, loss of rule of law
5 economic power: we have coercive exploita-
tion, extortion (e.g. organized crime)
5 religious power: we have generals as icons or
gods (e.g. Rome)
4 Where economic power dominates over
5 political power: we have regulatory capture,
exploitation of natural resources and exploita-
tion of workers (e.g. low wages)
5 military power: we have coercive employment
including prison labor and slavery
5 religious power: we have aspiration for wealth
and/or acceptance of subservience, work is
done for hoped for (prospect of) money and
not for money
4 Where political power dominates over
5 military power: we have wars of conquest
5 economic power: we have corruption
5 religious power: we have patriotism, suppres-
sion of other religions
4 Where religious power dominates over
5 military power: we have persecution, inquisi-
tions and religious wars
5 economic power: we have cult behavior
5 political power: we have religious law, prohi-
bition, witch hunts (e.g. McCarthyism)
Modern examples of relative but not complete domi-
nance of each of the four forms of power can be found in
Egypt for military power, US for economic power, China
for political power, and Iran for religious power.
XVI. DYNAMICS OF POWER
There are three kinds of dynamics of power: competi-
tion between power systems and their specific instantia-
tions, competition of leaders for power including aggrega-
tion and inter-leadership relationships, and an individual
leader’s transformation of values that affects how they
allocate the resources they have control over.
While there are distinct aspects of these three forms
of dynamics, there are also ways in which they all reflect
the competition between leaders. Leaders compete for
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power within a power system, as well as to gain control
over others that are currently part of a different power
structure. The latter can be reflected in conflict between
two systems with the same type of power, or two systems
with different types of power systems. Individual leaders
change their values and associated behaviors in ways that
depend on how vulnerable or secure their control is in
relation to other leaders. Still, dynamics may not be
entirely reflective of leader competition for power, as, for
example, power systems can compete even when they are
not subjects of the same individual leaders.
A. Dynamics of power systems
One of the central aspects of the historical narrative
is the changes that occur in power systems as reflected
in the prevalence of system types. While our analy-
sis of power is not exactly the same as the traditional
categories of political systems, changes in political sys-
tems are changes in power systems. Thus the histori-
cal changes of prevalence of monarchies, dictatorships,
democracy and communism reflect a competition be-
tween power systems. This competition occurs through
gradual change within a country, conquest by one coun-
try of another, as well as by revolution and mimicry of
power systems by one country of others.
The outcomes of competition between power systems
reflect the advantages that one power system has over an-
other. Intuitively a historical progression among power
systems arises because they provide increasing competi-
tive advantages, a kind of evolutionary dynamic. Com-
petitive advantage may arise from two different sources,
which are not independent: advantage to the populace,
hence their selection by the populace, and advantages in
competition at the collective scale, in one or more of the
categories of military, economic or religious conflict, as
reflected in the mechanisms by which such conflicts are
won.
In direct conflict between power systems where leaders
of the same type and their followers compete, the winner
is determined by qualities that can be readily identified,
though other aspects of the system may play a signif-
icant role. For example, conflict between militaries is
generally considered to be won by the scale of military
forces as measured by manpower and firepower. How-
ever, factors such as military technology and production
capacity may play a key role and unconventional war-
fare points to other factors of importance in particular
contexts. Conflict between religions is won by prosely-
tization and stubbornness (as well as ethnic conflict /
massacres and conquest of territories). Conflict between
economic systems is won by resources and their effective
allocation (as well as innovation). Conflict between polit-
ical power systems is won by popularity contest (as well
as political maneuvering).
When we consider the relative advantages of different
types of power systems, we should recognize that evolu-
tionary advantages are context and tradeoff dependent
and therefore involve subtle considerations and careful
analysis. This is manifest in biological evolution through
the diversity of biological organisms that are present in
the world today. For example, it is commonly stated that
a faster running cheetah has evolutionary advantage over
a slower one, hence the high speed they achieve. How-
ever, not all animals are as or even at all rapidly running,
nor are some able to run at all, and some can fly faster
than a cheetah can run. This points to the context spe-
cific nature of selective forces. We may infer that such
context specificity is also present in the evolution of social
systems and their power structures. As a first step, how-
ever, we can identify some advantages of power systems
in relation to each other by straightforward considera-
tions. These advantages are to be understood as subject
to clarification of the conditions under which they apply.
For example:
. Military dictatorships provide order and are thus
preferred over disorder, i.e. anarchy, as an absence
of a power system. Dictatorships will be selected
for over anarchy under conditions where large scale
resources are available, including those obtained by
conquest, and other external forces are not disrup-
tive of the power system. This is similar to multi-
cellular organisms, which have advantages over sin-
gle celled organisms in the presence of large scale
resources (e.g. food) that can be consumed, one
of which may be mutual consumption, and because
of the homeostatic environments that are formed
within them.
. Monarchies are advantageous over dictatorships
due to reduced conflict over leadership transitions.
This will be selected for under conditions of multi-
generational persistence of the power system.
. Democracies and Communism as political systems
are advantageous over monarchies due to the ad-
vantages associated with selection of leadership val-
ues and capabilities. They will be selected for un-
der conditions in which leadership decisions must
respond to an elevated level of internal complex-
ity of the society (note however the limitations of
hierarchical representative systems [13]).
. Free market based Democracies are advantageous
over systems that exercise price and production
control (e.g. Dictatorships and Communist sys-
tems) due to the advantages of economic coordi-
nation for complex economic activities.
. In general, we can argue that competition among
countries due to system capabilities and effective-
ness and for popular support tends to aggregate
power where large scale coordinated actions are
needed, and disaggregate power through specializa-
tion of leadership and increased complexity of ac-
tions in the face of increasing complexity in actions.
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The latter is similar to the evolutionary develop-
ment of cognitive capacities in animals through
neural systems as being an evolutionary advantage
in the context of environmental complexity of deci-
sion making.
Competition between groups involved in direct con-
frontation may reflect competition between power sys-
tems, when the power systems are different. It may
also reflect competition between different instances of the
same power system. In the latter case it may in part re-
flect competition between leaders for control over larger
population groups, a topic that is further discussed in the
next section.
Finally, we note that power systems may change not
because of direct competition but rather because of
changes in the conditions. Thus, discovery of natural
resources and technological changes can change the re-
sources that are present in the system. The changes in
resources then affect power structures. For example, the
industrial revolution in changing the means and organi-
zations associated with economic wealth also created new
power structures.
B. Dynamics of leadership
Evolutionary dynamics are only one aspect of the dy-
namics of power systems, just as evolutionary dynamics
are only one aspect of the dynamics of biological organ-
isms. For clarity, among the others in biology are devel-
opment, aging, damage, recovery, metabolic, cellular and
molecular processes.
Key to the dynamics of power systems are internal
country competition and cooperation between leaders.
Leadership competition tends toward consolidation of
power as leaders seek increasing control as a means to
achieve their objectives. Note that this internal dynamic
of power aggregation is generally counter to the evolu-
tionary dynamic that seeks to distribute that control for
effectiveness of the system. Aggregation of power is lim-
ited by death, and thus mechanisms of inheritance are a
key aspect of how power aggregates over time.
In the process of power consolidation by leaders, dif-
ferent types of leaders can employ different methods. We
can identify these methods from their type of power. In
each case there is a mechanism of direct power use to take
control, and a mechanism of cooperation that can result
in power sharing, mutual strengthening and dependency.
Specifically:
. Political leaders gain control through popular sup-
port for subverting or conditionally legitimizing
other leaders.
. Military leaders gain control by threatening or by
providing security for other leaders.
. Economic leaders gain control by buying out or pro-
viding resources for other leaders.
. Religious leaders gain control by proselytization of
other leaders or by advocating on their behalf to
others.
When a particular type of leader gains control they not
only change the balance of power between leaders, they
change the nature of the power system by strengthening
that type of power. Note that in all cases the differences
between different types of methods used may be driven
by values as well as circumstances.
Thus, for example, where leaders cooperate, economic
power supports military power through taxation as part
of social values promoted by religious leaders reflected in
laws established by political power. Military power sup-
ports political power through preventing anti-leadership
or revolutionary activity, as well as defending against for-
eign occupation and other threats. Ideological leaders
promote values of leaders promoting economic, security
and other benefits for the public, as well as values of the
public (and leaders) that reinforce support of leaders. Po-
litical leaders implement laws and allocate resources for
the public, as well as for economic growth and military
defense, reflecting values promoted by religious leaders.
There is an important distinction between leaders that
cooperate with each other for mutual support and leaders
that cooperate in support of the system of power itself.
Military leaders might promote particular economic or
political leaders, but this would undermine the structure
of an economic system in which economic competition
is the mechanism of promotion of economic leaders, and
a political system in which political leaders are selected
by public opinion and thus motivated and having capa-
bilities in the promotion of public good. Similarly, eco-
nomic leaders might promote individual political leaders
by financial support, but this undermines the structure
of the power system in a context in which political lead-
ers are selected because of motivation and benefits that
they provide to the public.
As another example, where military power competes
with economic power, military power can threaten eco-
nomic power to obtain resources, or economic power can
buy out military power, i.e. gain authority over it by
providing support. Either way money flows to military
power, and coercive control to economic power. If the
extent of such competitive interaction increases, military
forces may gain extensive control over wealth, or eco-
nomic forces may gain extensive control over military ac-
tions to control workers by coercion instead of paying
for labor. In this context we can see how values (ideol-
ogy/religion) are an important aspect of the competition
for power. For example, military values may limit the
extent to which military leaders seek wealth. On the
other hand, if it favors wealth, then military power may
threaten economic power to obtain dictatorship control
over economic resources. The competition also occurs in
the context of popular support. For example, military
power and economic power compete if they are both try-
ing to gain political power.
We can see that the different kinds of power cooper-
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ate or compete in different structures. In a cooperative
context:
. Military power provides for security and enforce-
ment of laws, i.e. social order, which promotes the
framework in which economic, political and reli-
gious power is exercised,
◦ it enforces rules of ownership and protects the
wealthy from crime,
◦ it provides security for the political leaders
against opponents,
◦ it provides security for religious leaders,
◦ it provides security for the public.
. Political power provides
◦ laws that protect military, economic and reli-
gious leaders,
◦ laws that enable economic leaders to make
economic decisions and exploit resources,
◦ subsidies for economic activity, for the mili-
tary, and for the populace.
. Religious power provides values that promote
◦ public respect for economic, political and reli-
gious leaders and their decisions,
◦ public actions in support of collective causes,
◦ distribution of resources for the well being of
the society and the public in particular.
. Economic power provides management of resources
and labor and coordination of processes
◦ for the public good,
◦ in support of military actions and religious
communications,
◦ in support of political figures reflecting suc-
cessful outcomes of policy decisions that pro-
mote economic growth and social benefits.
In each case we can replace positive with negative interac-
tions for systems with antagonistic interactions. Antago-
nistic interactions undermine leadership. Undermining is
distinct from, but may be part of, interactions that lead
to takeover by one power of another.
C. Values of leaders and its dynamics
Power can serve for the benefit of the group, includ-
ing the individuals that are subject to power. It is also
apparent that power can serve for the benefit of the in-
dividuals who are wielding power. Which is the case?
Decisions by an individual in power may lead to vary-
ing degrees of benefit for the collective and for the indi-
vidual in power. Values of a leader determine whether
their decisions are intended for the benefit of themselves
or for the collective that empowers them (or another
group). Thus the benefits of power can either serve an
individual or the collective. While intentions and out-
comes are not always aligned, under conditions in which
consequences of actions are clear, intent corresponds to
outcomes: Capability and values combine to determine
societal and individual benefits.
Quite generally, the values of an individual affect (1)
what he does for himself and (2) what he does for others
(others may be distinguished in group categories). For
an individual who wields power and controls actions of
others and receives resources from others the values of
that individual affect (1) what he uses/takes (allocates)
for himself and (2) what he uses/gives (allocates) to oth-
ers (in group categories). This includes both immediate
use and allocation for future use.
Thus, all types of leaders may and often do use power
for self-benefits, including self-benefits that are consid-
ered to be counter to the idealized values of the power
system. Self-benefits may be considered through biolog-
ical and social needs and desires. This is manifest in
financial gain and associated luxuries, and sexual miscon-
duct as reflected in “scandals.” Note that this includes
religious leaders even when the values they profess and
espouse for others contradict such actions.
We can identify a theory of individual transformation
of values in the expression “power corrupts.” This state-
ment embodies a dynamic concept. Specifically, that
there is a change in individual values as a result of the
wielding of power. The change shifts the behavior of
the individual toward serving him or herself rather than
others. Implicit in this dynamic is the existence of al-
ternatives, i.e. that an individual wielding power may
not be serving him or herself. We see that this simple
expression captures a remarkably rich set of concepts. It
suggests that persistence of power leads progressively to
more self-allocation and use of power for self-benefit.
XVII. CONCLUSIONS
We have identified four types of power based upon the
underlying structure of human motivation and charac-
terized the historical nature of power systems and the
dynamics of power in terms of them. Societal benefits
from establishing leadership for collective action can be
identified. However, the essential paradox of transfer of
power to a leader is that the purpose of the transfer of
power as far as a group is concerned is for benefit to the
members of the group, but the opportunity is present for
the leader to exercise power for self-benefit. Power dy-
namical processes include (1) the dynamics of change of
the relative benefit assignment to leader and group, (2)
the competition and cooperation among different lead-
ers, including different types of leaders, and (3) compe-
tition among power systems. It can be expected that
the dynamics of individual leader values favors increas-
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ing self-benefit over time (power corrupts), the dynamics
of power shifting may under some conditions favor group
benefit but also power aggregation, and the evolution-
ary dynamics of groups and power systems at least under
some conditions favors distributing power and group ben-
efits, though group benefit may not equally serve every
group member. Historical processes appear to result in a
shift toward distributed power systems, though individ-
ual countries today continue to be dominated by specific
types of power including political (e.g. China), economic
(e.g. US), military (e.g. Egypt) and religious (e.g. Iran)
leaders.
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